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Towards a Benjaminian Critique of




1 In the text, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” (1918), Walter Benjamin frames
his investigation into the philosophies of Kant and neo-Kantianism in a two-fold manner:
“First of all, there was the question of the certainty of knowledge that is lasting, and,
second,  there  was  the  question  of  the  dignity  [Dignität]  of an  experience  that  is
ephemeral”.1 In  this  article  I  will  take  this  as  the problem  of  neo-Kantianism,  for
Benjamin.  This  is  the  problem of  the  establishment  of  continuity  between  objective
knowledge  and  so-called  ephemeral  experience,  i.e.  a  form  of  experience  that  is
fragmentary and subjective. As I will show, for Benjamin, Kant was only able to give an
answer to the first problem since his aim was to secure the timeless validity and certainty
of cognition. In regards to neo-Kantianism, in order to secure the integrity of cognition
from the  ephemeral  nature  of  experience,  their  concepts  had  to  be  purified  of  any
content taken from sensible perception. The price neo-Kantianism paid for the dignity
and  integrity  of  its  epistemological  standpoint  was  the  subordination  of  empirical
experience to a transcendent conception of pure thought and a strictly logical method.
Accordingly, the aim of this article is to clarify Benjamin’s relationship to neo-Kantianism
and to provide the grounds for a Benjaminian critique of neo-Kantianism.
2 This piece will  be divided into two parts.  First,  I  will  examine the neo-Kantianism of
Hermann  Cohen.  I  will  focus  on  Cohen’s  logical  and  scientific  form  of  idealism,  in
particular its critique of Lange’s subjective idealism, on the one hand, and empiricism, on
the other. Finally, I will look at Benjamin’s engagement with neo-Kantianism, specifically
in “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” and the short fragment “On Perception”
(1917) that precedes it.
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I. Hermann Cohen’s Logical Idealism
3 Hermann Cohen’s neo-Kantianism exists in a relationship to the form of neo-Kantianism
that preceded it, specifically the early neo-Kantianism of Hermann von Helmholtz and
Friedrich  Albert  Lange.  Helmholtz  and  Lange  defended  Kantianism  against  the
philosophical  standpoint  known  as  scientific  materialism.  Put  very  briefly,  scientific
materialism held,  against Kant,  that the senses were the only instruments capable of
objective knowledge of reality: 
There is no visible reason whatever why nature should deceive man … We may take
a photograph of  an object,  a  rose,  for  instance.  It  would be  impossible  for  this
photograph to  evoke the  same presentation in  our  brain  as  the  original,  if  the
presentation was not a fairly correct interpreter of reality.2
4 Helmholtz took issue with the empiricism characteristic of  scientific materialism and
held that sensation produced “signs [Zeichen] of the objects of the external world, and
correspond[s] to them only in some such way as written characters or articulate words to
the things they denote”.3 Helmholtz takes the precise opposite position to that of the
scientific materialists: the image of an object is analogous to the original. Sensation offers
a representation (or Abbild) of an object, but does not provide a direct copy (or Bild) of it.
5 For his part, Lange deepens Helmholtz’ critique of empiricism in his distinction between
reality  and  the  ideal.  For  Lange,  as  for  Helmholtz,  the  sense  organs  are  organs  of
abstraction,  not  truth.  They  can  only  lead  to  what  is  relatively  true.4 For  Lange,
materialism  points  to  what  the  idealist  already  knows:  that  knowledge,  even  sense
knowledge, is a product of human organisation. Materialism, the lowest and firmest stage
in philosophy, should be restricted to the empirical, while idealism should deal with the
loftier  aspects  of  human reason.  Ideas  are  products  of  human organisation  that  are
“grounded in the natural disposition of mankind and possess a practical purpose”.5 Lange
offers what he refers to as the standpoint of the ideal, which is creative and aesthetic in
character.  The danger of  the ideal  is  that materialism can destroy it  as long as it  is
inexorably entwined with religious thought. Only by removing the core of religion in the
process of elevating the soul above reality can idealism ensure its safety from materialist
criticism.6 Lange claims that we must separate the idea “from any correspondence with
historical and scientific knowledge, but also without falsification of them, let us accustom
ourselves to regard the world of ideas as figurative representation of the entire truth, as just
as indispensable to human progress as the knowledge of the understanding”.7 The strict
separation between reality and the ideal  is  central  to Lange’s  standpoint in order to
maintain  the  integrity  of  the  ideal  from the  mechanistic  worldview of  the  scientific
materialists. At the same time, in viewing the ideal as purely figurative and external to
reality, Lange inserts an ontological gap between the objectivity of the empirical world –
governed by the mechanistic  forces  described by scientific  materialism – and a free,
spontaneous ideal that can only exist in contradistinction to reality. I will now move onto
Cohen, beginning with his critique of Lange’s standpoint of the ideal.
6 For  Cohen,  Lange’s  distinction  between  materialism and  idealism was  superficial.  In
renouncing  idealism’s  claim  to  knowledge  of  reality,  Lange  is  forced  to  accept  an
empiricist theory of knowledge: knowledge must be restricted to what can be verified in
experience.  By  reading  Kant’s  deduction  of  the  categories  psycho-physically,  Lange
believed  that  he  could  legitimately  claim  to  have  overcome  the  gap  between  the
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transcendental and empirical in Kant’s thought. For Cohen, this led to an inability on
Lange’s part to locate his practical philosophy within the theoretical. This not only raises
a problem for practical philosophy, but for theoretical philosophy as well. Lange, Cohen
claims, treats the idea as “an inner emotional concept” rather than as an “epistemological
emblem”.8 As a result of his naturalisation of the idea and his abandonment of ethics to
the transcendent realm of the idea, Lange fundamentally misunderstood the nature of
idealism. In contrast to Lange, Cohen aimed to assign ethics a status that raises it to the
same level of dignity as the concepts of logic or mathematics. In doing so, he goes further
than Lange in conceiving of the ethical idea as something that totally exceeds experience
yet, at the same time, forms its fundamental basis. In Cohen’s words: “If all reality of
experience,  if  all  sensible  existence were destroyed,  its  boundaries  in the noumenon
would have to remain. If all nature were to perish, the Idea of freedom would remain. If
all experience should cease, ethical reality would remain”.9 
7 Against Lange’s subjective ideal, as I will show, Cohen understands the ethical idea as a
hypothesis that underlies empirical reality in pure thought. For Cohen, pure thought or
reason cannot merely be a product of sensation. In turn, reality cannot be reduced to
what can be sensibly intuited. As Cohen states in the Religion of Reason (1919): “The senses 
are in direct opposition to reason; basically they are common to animals and men”.10 In
his logical and systematic approach, Cohen places his emphasis on critical idealism’s role
in providing an epistemological foundation not only for ethics but also for all domains of
inquiry into the nature of reality. Central to this project is a conception of the idea as
hypothesis. Cohen places his conception of pure thought – thought that produces content
by itself – against notions of representational thinking. According to Cohen’s reading of
Kant, the factual validity of mathematical principles is presupposed and these principles
are  seen  as  pure  because  they  are  self-evident  and  non-derivable  from  empirical
experience.11 For Cohen, mathematics is a model for pure thought insofar as it is non-
representational; real  knowledge  is  pure  thought  free  from sensuous  representation.
Ideas as hypotheses both precede and ground being. As hypotheses, ideas provide the
objective grounding for forms of representational thinking which follow.
8 The result of this conception of the relationship between conceptual science and reality
is,  for Cohen, the re-establishment of the link between both theoretical and practical
philosophy, on the one hand, and speculative philosophical thought and scientific inquiry
into the empirical world, on the other. However, by rejecting the subjectivist reading of
Kant, Cohen subtly shifts the ground of Kant’s critique. In order to become scientifically
valid, experience comes to be identified with scientific cognition. For Cohen, philosophy
does not take science’s place, but as a form of critique it takes the ‘fact’ of science as its
starting  point.  The  aim  of  critical  idealism  differs  from  science  in  that  it  is  the
transcendental  investigation  into  the  possibility  of  nature  as  an  object  of  scientific
inquiry as such. Cohen is able to assert that the progress of critical philosophy plays a
foundational role in principles that underlie natural science. Cohen, therefore, follows
Lange’s  privileging  of  thought  over  reality:  “pure  thought  as  the  method  for  the
foundation of  reality”.12 As  such,  critical  philosophy is  best  placed to investigate the
grounds of science’s claim to knowledge of reality. This is the meaning of the neo-Kantian
program of epistemological critique: that philosophy provides a critical theory of knowledge
that is able to reflect on both its own and science’s methodological presuppositions.
9 For Cohen, any theory of the subject must wrestle with the fact that an empirical or
psychological subject is not the subject of valid knowledge, but of error. The objectivity
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and validity of knowledge must, therefore, be posited at the level of a transcendental
logic that exceeds the empirical psychological subject. Cohen marks a distinction between
an empirical subject who is the subject of error, and the form of transcendental logic that
exceeds both the empirical subject and reality itself. Critical idealism asserts a logical-
transcendental subject that acts as the normative principle and grounds for a form of
judgement that is free from error. With this, Cohen is able to overcome the distinction
between materialism and idealism that Lange could only achieve by assigning the two
standpoints to their respective theoretical corners. Against Lange’s dualism, Cohen is able
to reconcile the two standpoints immanently in pure thought. Materialism’s absolute –
whether it is matter, the atom, or nature – only gains its objective reality as a product of
pure thought. The application of a concept of pure thought to empirical reality and the
objective  knowledge  that  this  application  provides  can  only  be  justified  critically  in
reference to the concept’s origin.  It  is this notion of origin that is central to Cohen’s
critical idealism. Through his concept of origin, Cohen is able to posit a transcendental
unity  of  consciousness  that  exists  in  pure  thought  prior  to  any  distinction  between
subject and object. For Cohen, there is a logical origin [Ursprung] prior to any form of
judgement based on the distinction between thought and being.
10 Inherent in Cohen’s conception of rational origin, therefore, is a rejection of the Kantian
separation of the spontaneous faculty of the understanding and a receptive faculty of
sensibility. Cohen remains within the Kantian problematic in relation to the limits of
possible experience, in particular the limit of empirical or sense experience. However, he
separates his logic of origin from any form of philosophy that begins from a logic of
being, a standpoint that Cohen claims characterized romanticism.13 In Cohen’s logic of
origin, being or existence is subordinated to pure thought. Cohen’s claim is that the logic
of origin is the foundation of modern science and, therefore, his form of idealism. Origin
is a principle for Cohen in two senses of the word: first, it is the supreme principle of pure
knowledge from which every content originates and is grounded; second, pure thought as
the thought of origin produces both the object of knowledge and grounds that object in
thought.
11 For Cohen, “[o]nly thought itself can produce what can count as being”.14 In terms of the
first point, the aim of knowledge is a process of verification by which it can verify objects
of knowledge as products of pure thought.15 In terms of the second, Cohen’s conception of
pure thought requires that nothing be given to thought prior to its determinations. In
other words, to the extent that it is productive, pure thought must be able to situate its
object of knowledge within itself prior to any a posteriori determinations. Pure thought
does not presuppose a given reality or object which presents itself to thought externally
through  the  forms  of  sensible  intuition.  Kant’s  “Anticipations  of  Perception”
demonstrates how appearance manifests itself in sensible intuition. There is, for Kant, a
sense in which the object must have a substantial reality in order for it to appear as object
for determination by the understanding. For Cohen, by contrast, the givenness of the
object is not an issue; the determination of reality is consigned solely to the spontaneous
and productive understanding. Empirical reality, as an apparently independent object of
knowledge standing over and against pure thought, is conceived as an incomplete object
to which the epistemological method of the mathematical sciences is successively and
continually applied.  The object of scientific knowledge, given to thought through the
forms of sensible intuition, can be said to exist merely as a ‘not yet’ conceptualized point
on which the methods of mathematical and natural science are progressively converging.
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12 Cohen,  then,  conceives  of  the  forms of  Kant’s  “Transcendental  Aesthetic”  as  a  mere
moment in the process of the progressive methodological development of the natural
sciences. While Cohen acknowledges the importance of the forms of intuition for Kant, he
is also, at the same time, able to undermine their centrality within the Kantian system. In
other words, for Cohen, Kant quite correctly began from the highest point of scientific
development  available  to  him,  but  that  moment  has  since  been subordinated in  the
movement of scientific progress. The validity of the forms of intuition as principles of
science  must  be  acknowledged,  but  they  were  not  Kant’s  central  contribution  to
philosophy. Rather, for Cohen, Kant’s significance is found in his general methodological
starting point: the basic ‘fact’ of pure mathematical science, rather than the application
of  any particular  scientific  principles.  For  Cohen,  the reality  intuited through Kant’s
forms is not something that exists over and against the concepts of natural science as a
‘thing’ to be deciphered. Rather, reality is only constituted as an object of knowledge
through its subordination to pure,  meta-empirical scientific concepts.16 Therefore,  for
Cohen, the manifold of sensation existing independently of pure thought is substituted
for the methodological progression of science and a genetic theory of knowledge.
13 The  principles  of  this  form  of  thought  are  non-representational,  mathematical,  and
independent of empirical consciousness. In contrast to the ephemeral nature of sense-
experience, Cohen claims that philosophy “requires the presupposition of the eternal as
opposed to the transitoriness of the earthly institutions and human ideas”.17 In light of
this, it can be said that Cohen subordinates being and existence to thought in order to
safeguard the certainty and continuity of  knowledge against the transitory nature of
sensibility and experience. For Cohen being is primarily the being of thinking and this is
what distinguishes his form of logical idealism from what he understood as the logic of
being characteristic of subject-oriented forms of idealism that include both Helmholtz
and Lange.
14 Cohen’s most significant break with Kant is his conception of pure thought,  which is
based on the rejection of Kant’s dualistic claim that knowledge has its origin in both the
active faculty of the understanding, on one side, and the passive faculty of sensibility that
exists independently of the understanding, on the other. Cohen, therefore, rejects the
independent mediating faculty of pure intuition. He is able to overcome the problems
that  this  rejection  introduces  by  incorporating  what he  calls  the  ‘fact’  of  the  pure
mathematical science. By incorporating this ‘fact’ of pure mathematic science into his
logical method, Cohen is able to subordinate sensibility to the understanding through an
extension of the transcendental logic to the forms of sensible intuition. For Cohen, this is
possible since space and time are conceived of merely as principles derived from the fact
of science. Cohen’s pure logical thought, then, becomes the basis for scientific experience
in contradistinction to Kant’s ultimately empiricist concept of experience, which is based
upon the faculties  of  sensible  intuition.  While  Kant  was forced to posit  a  separation
between experience and knowledge, Cohen is able to posit the continuity of knowledge
and scientific experience. For Cohen the continuity occurs within pure thought itself
through  the  dissolution  of  the  Kantian  distinction  between  sensibility  and  the
understanding. The continuity that Cohen asserts, however, is only established through
the purification of empirical experience, i.e. within scientific experience and the 
15 subordination of a posteriori experience to the logical structures of pure mathematical
science.
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II. Benjamin’s Critique of Cohen’s Logical Idealism
16 How does Walter Benjamin relate to the neo-Kantian tradition? In the two texts I examine
at length in this section – his fragment “On Perception” and his essay “The Program of
the  Coming  Philosophy”  –  Benjamin  problematizes  the  Kantian  and  neo-Kantian
epistemological standpoint. Kant, Benjamin claims, began from a very narrow concept of
experience:
As an experience of the world, it was of the lowest order. The very fact that Kant
was  able  to  commence  his  immense  work  under  the  constellation  of  the
Enlightenment indicates that he undertook his work on the basis of an experience
virtually reduced to a nadir, to a minimum of significance. Indeed, one can say that
the very greatness of his work, his unique radicalism, presupposed an experience
which had almost no intrinsic value and which could have attained its (we may say)
sad significance only through its certainty.18
17 While it is true that, Kant, especially in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that will
be able to come forward as Science (1783), derived the principles of experience from natural
science, particularly mathematical physics, he did not aim to make experience identical
to the ‘object realm’ of science. Nevertheless, Kant did restrict the possible objects of
experience  to  those  of  Euclidean  geometry  and  Newtonian  physics  insofar  as  the
experience that counted for Kant was a form of scientific experience. As I will show, the
Kantian emphasis  on an objective  and certain  form of  scientific  experience  led to  a
separation between experience in the everyday sense of the word and pure knowledge.
18 In contrast to the Kantian non-identity of knowledge and experience, Benjamin locates a
different trend amongst the neo-Kantians.  Specifically he recognizes their attempt to
provide a systematic unity of knowledge. Whether or not this is successful remains to be
seen, but nevertheless it remains an important point of difference between Kant and neo-
Kantianism. Neither the Marburg School, of which Cohen was a member, nor the South-
West or Baden School were exclusively concerned with scientific knowledge, but were
interested in aesthetics,  religion and ethics – in the case of Cohen – and history and
culture  in  the  case  of  Heinrich  Rickert.  In  light  of  this,  it  is  essential  to  grasp  the
distinction between Kant and neo-Kantianism in Benjamin’s critique. Therefore, I propose
to evaluate Benjamin’s critique of Kant and neo-Kantianism on the basis of the two-fold
problem of experience he poses: “First of all, there was the question of the certainty of
knowledge that is lasting, and, second, there was the question of the dignity [Dignität] of
an experience that is ephemeral”.19 For Benjamin, Kant was only able to give an answer to
the  first  question since  his  aim was  to  secure  the  timeless  validity  and certainty  of
cognition. In regards to neo-Kantianism, in order to secure the integrity of cognition
from the  ephemeral  nature  of  experience,  their  concepts  had  to  be  purified  of  any
content taken from sensible perception. Thus, the price that neo-Kantianism paid for the
dignity and integrity of its epistemological standpoint was the subordination of empirical
experience to a transcendent conception of pure thought and a strictly logical method.
19 Before moving onto Benjamin’s critique of neo-Kantianism, it is necessary to examine
how  his  critique  relates  to Kant,  and  also  how  neo-Kantianism  interprets  Kantian
philosophy. This will allow us to navigate Benjamin’s apparent conflation of Kant and
neo-Kantianism in the aforementioned texts. It is useful, in this regard, to briefly examine
Benjamin’s  fragment  “On  Perception”,  written  in  1917,  which  precedes  the  1918
“Program”.  In  this  text,  the  conflation  of  the  Kantian  and neo-Kantian  standpoints
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appears more pronounced. Benjamin appears to provide a justification for the necessity
of the neo-Kantian approach to concept formation from within the standpoint of Kantian
critical  philosophy.  In  short,  Benjamin  appears  to  largely  accept  the  neo-Kantian
problematic  in  regards  to  conceptual  realism,  i.e.  the  view that  concepts  are  mirror
images or accurate reproductions of reality – a view that both Cohen and Rickert rejected.
Thus,  Benjamin accepts the necessity of  a fundamental  separation between empirical
experience and pure knowledge. The necessity of this separation is found in Kant’s aim to
avoid the collapse of his metaphysical concept of pure knowledge into the concept of
experience. Benjamin locates a specific meaning of metaphysics in the context of Kant’s
philosophy: “Kant produced a metaphysics of nature and in it described that part of the
natural sciences which is pure – that which proceeds not from experience but simply
from reason a priori”.20 This conception of knowledge faced potential problems from two
sides.  On one  side,  there  is  the  empiricist  problem of  collapsing  sensibility  into  the
understanding. As a result, knowledge becomes subjective; it is conceived of as a product
of  experience.  On the other hand,  there is  the rationalist  problem of  a discontinuity
between knowledge and experience.  In  order  to  avoid this  problematic,  as  Benjamin
states, Kant posited “the so-called material of sensation to express the separation of the
forms of intuition from the categories”.21 In doing so, Kant could ground the continuity of
a posteriori experience and knowledge while retaining the necessary separation between
pure knowledge and empirical  experience.  The separation was  achieved through the
forms of intuition in which, as Benjamin puts it, the material of sensation is “imperfectly
absorbed”.22
20 For Benjamin, however, despite the scrutiny that Kant gives to metaphysics qua pure
cognition, the concept of experience does not undergo the same critical treatment. In
light  of  this,  Benjamin  makes  a  fundamental  distinction  between  the  concept  of
experience [der Begriff der Erfahrung] and the cognition of experience [die Erkenntnis der
Erfahrung] which, he claims, have often been conflated in both Kantian and pre-Kantian
philosophy.  Due  to  this  conflation,  the  differences  between  the  immediate  natural
concept of experience and the cognition of experience have become confused. In order to
secure the continuity and give it  the quality of  being a possible  object  of  cognition,
cognition  of  experience  must  be  unified  at  a  level  that  exceeds  transitory  sense
experience. Thus, as Benjamin claims, at this point we are talking about two different
conceptual realms – one empirical or experiential, and the other conceptual.
21 What Benjamin terms the cognition of experience, operates at the level of pure scientific
knowledge,  not  concrete  experience.  As  Benjamin states,  for  Kant  “experience as  an
object of cognition is the unified and continuous manifold of cognition”.23 In other words,
it is only in the form of abstract objective experience that experience as such can become
a proper object of cognition in the Kantian sense. Thus, for Benjamin, the experience that
counted for Kant was that which could be granted the status of objective validity, i.e. that
form of experience that Benjamin terms scientific experience. Kant had to separate what he
understands as pure experience from natural or empirical experience in order to secure it
as a valid object of knowledge. Therefore, for Kant, cognition is, as Benjamin insisted
above, the system of nature, but with the caveat that the system of nature is by no means
merely what is intuited sensibly.
22 According  to  Benjamin,  it  is  precisely  on  the  discontinuity  between  cognition  and
experience that Kant distinguished himself from the pre-Enlightenment tradition. For
Benjamin, the pre-Enlightenment or rationalist tradition had an exalted conception of
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experience, one that was close to God. As such, the possibility of a rationalist deduction of
knowledge  from  a  first  principle,  i.e.  the  absolute,  or  an  empiricist  deduction  of
knowledge from experience was deemed possible. For Benjamin, however, the concept of
experience that characterized the Enlightenment had, by contrast, been “stripped of its
proximity to God”.24 In conceiving of God as remote from both nature and existence, the
concept  of  experience  had  been  implicitly  transformed.  For  Benjamin,  what  Kant
provided  was  the  methodological  grounds  by  which  such  an  impoverished  form  of
experience  can  become  a  valid  object  of  knowledge,  i.e.  one  that  is  objective  and
universal. In order to guarantee the certainty and objectivity of knowledge, an appeal to
principles beyond mere experience is necessary. Thus a discontinuity between experience
and pure cognition is introduced, and the Newtonian and Euclidean conceptions of space
and time become the valid forms of pure sensible intuition.25 
23 Implicit  within Kant’s  theory of  knowledge,  therefore,  is  a restriction of  the possible
objects of experience to those presented through the forms of pure intuition, namely
objects of Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian physics. Furthermore, the grounds upon
which the knowledge of  the object  is  established objectively prohibits  the continuity
between  empirical  consciousness  and  experience  qua  scientific experience.  Genuine
knowledge rests on transcendental consciousness, a pure epistemological consciousness
stripped of  any subjective character.  Despite  this  separation between knowledge and
experience, as Benjamin claims, Kant’s transcendental consciousness is formed through
an analogy with empirical consciousness. Objectively certain knowledge is produced in
relation  to  an  empirical  consciousness  whose  experience  is  characterized  by  the
impoverished experience available to it. This is Benjamin’s crucial point: Kant objectifies
the impoverished concept of experience – the only experience he sees as available to the
empirical  subject  –  in the transcendental  subject.  As such,  the limited,  impoverished
concept  of  experience  is  hypostasized  when  it  becomes  the  basis  of  the  Kantian
conception of pure knowledge.
24 In light of this, Benjamin appears to see some promise in the neo-Kantian dissolution of
the distinction between intuition and the intellect, something he also mentions in the
fragment “On Perception”. With this, Benjamin claims, there is a reconfiguration of the
concept  of  experience  itself.  Within  the  elimination  of  the  distinction  between  the
independent  faculty  of  sensible  intuition  and  the  spontaneous  faculty  of  the
understanding  is  a  point  at  which  the  subject-object  logic  of  Kant’s  epistemology  is
undermined. The question is how far can Benjamin take this from within the standpoint
of  neo-Kantianism?  In  his  critique,  Benjamin  makes  clear  that  in  the  interest  of
establishing the continuity of experience, neo-Kantianism represented experience as the
system  of  sciences.  As  Benjamin  claims,  the  neo-Kantian  “rectification”  of  Kant’s
separation  of  sensibility  and  understanding  ends  “in  the  extreme  extension  of  the
mechanical aspect of the relatively empty Enlightenment concept of experience”.26 They
remain within the Kantian conception of experience as scientific experience that could
not absorb metaphysical experience any more than the material of sensation is absorbed
by the forms of sensible intuition. Thus, at the precise point at which neo-Kantianism
aims to move beyond the Kantian concept of experience, it remains tied to the Kantian
theory of knowledge. Accordingly, for Benjamin, both Kant and neo-Kantianism remain
tied to a concept of experience derived from an Enlightenment worldview that comes to
occupy a mythical status in both philosophies. In their attempt to overcome the object
nature  of  the  thing-in-itself,  both  Kant  and  neo-Kantianism  prioritize  a  concept  of
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experience, and a subject of that experience, which is discontinuous with experience in
the everyday sense of the word. 
25 By beginning from the ‘fact of science’, reality is absorbed into pure thought as the object
realm to  which  the  methods  of  pure  mathematical  science  are  applied.27 Knowledge
becomes  objective  through  its  subordination  to  a  transcendental  logic  distinct  from
empirical  reality  and  a  posteriori  experience.  But  while  Kant  was  forced  to  posit  a
separation between experience and knowledge, Cohen is able to posit the continuity of
knowledge  and  scientific  experience.  For  Cohen  the  continuity  occurs  within  pure
thought itself through the dissolution of the Kantian distinction between sensibility and
the understanding.  Thus,  Cohen achieves  what  Kant  could not  within his  separation
between the faculties of sensibility and understanding. The continuity Cohen establishes,
however, is only established through the purification of empirical experience, i.e. within
scientific  experience  and  the  subordination  of  a  posteriori  experience  to  the  logical
structures of pure mathematical science.
26 Therefore, the solution offered by the neo-Kantians to Kant’s separation of knowledge
and  experience  exacerbates  the  problem  for  Benjamin.  Neo-Kantianism  extends  the
mechanical concept of experience that Benjamin found so problematic in the first place.
Further,  the  mythical  separation  between  subject  and  object  that  Kant  presupposed
becomes the foundation of neo-Kantian epistemology. The given reality of perception –
the empirical world – is conceived as an object of knowledge upon which the methods of
natural science are continually and progressively converging. The objects that constitute
that world are meaningful  only insofar as they are objects of, or  perhaps better yet,
objects  for knowledge.  As  Peter  Fenves  claims,  within  this  mechanical  concept  of
experience “there is no object of experience, for objects mean nothing”.28 For Benjamin,
neo-Kantianism had to reject sense experience in order to secure the continuity of pure
scientific knowledge. Cohen’s neo-Kantianism pushes the Kantian scientific worldview to
its  limit  by  absorbing  empirical  reality  into  pure  thought;  the  object  of  scientific
knowledge is thus not a concrete phenomenal thing, but a purely conceptual idea that
exists in total separation from the world of perception and experience. The systematic
continuum of knowledge and experience is achieved at the level of scientific knowledge
through  the  extension  of  a  form  of  transcendental  logic.  Thus,  neo-Kantianism  is
systematic  in  a  way  that  Kantian  philosophy  could  not  be;  but  it  only  achieves  its
systematicity by subordinating all  forms of experience to its pure logic based on the
principles of mathematical and natural science. In opposition to the Kantian separation of
knowledge and experience, Cohen provides the foundation of the systematic continuity
and unity of knowledge through the absolutisation of a genetic conception of pure logical
thought.
27 It  is  from  this  perspective  that  Benjamin  claims  experience  has  been  reduced  to
something meaningless, insignificant and without value for neo-Kantianism. Experience
only  becomes  significant  when  it  is  objectified  and  subordinated  to  meta-empirical
scientific principles or, as Benjamin states, “through its certainty”.29 Science requires an
object, an object moreover that is objective and certain. For experience to become such
an object, its timeless validity must be secured. As objects of scientific inquiry, experience
and the objects of experience are conceived of as meaningful and significant only insofar
as  they  can  be  understood  as  valid  objects  of  knowledge;  experience  itself  is  only
continuous and certain insofar as it becomes objectified as scientific experience. Thus,
while Benjamin concurs with the neo-Kantian demand for a continuity of experience and
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knowledge, he disputes the mathematical and scientific foundation of their epistemology
that prioritizes abstract scientific experience and posits the unity of subject and object of
experience within pure logical thought. Such a standpoint creates an unbridgeable gulf
between the experiencing subject and the object of experience while, at the same time,
stripping objects of their individual significance and meaning.
 
Conclusion
28 The twin aims of Benjamin’s text become quite clear when counter-posed with Cohen’s
logical idealism: firstly, establishing the possibility of the continuity of knowledge and
experience  from  the  standpoint  of  concrete  empirical  experience;  secondly,  the
overcoming of the mythic separation of subject and object that Benjamin views as present
in both Kant’s philosophy and neo-Kantianism. As Benjamin states:
The task of future epistemology is to find for knowledge a sphere of total neutrality
in regard to the concepts of both subject and object; in other words to discover the
autonomous, innate sphere of knowledge in which this concept no longer continues
to designate the relation between two metaphysical entities.30
29 In  order  to  overcome  the  mechanistic  and  abstract  categories  of  neo-Kantianism,
Benjamin proposes a revision of the Kantian categories founded upon or connected to
what  he  refers  to  as  primal  concepts  [Urbegriffe].  With  its  mathematical  and  logical
ontology,  neo-Kantianism  had  extended  the  Aristotelian  categories  of  Kant’s
transcendental logic that are, for Benjamin, “both arbitrarily posed and exploited in a
very one-sided way by Kant in the light of mechanical experience”.31 With a new theory of
orders, Benjamin claims to be able to expand the possible areas of experience to include
those areas that Kant was unable to systematize.32 While systematic in his intent, the
categories  of  Benjamin’s  theory of  knowledge would not  be imposed externally  onto
experience from the standpoint of a timelessly valid scientific knowledge. Rather, the
theory  of  knowledge  itself  must  be  expanded  to  include  a  form  of  experience  that
Benjamin calls “multiply gradated” and “nonmechanical”.33 
30  Benjamin highlights a tension between the Kantian claim that the concepts must be
connected  to  a  form  of  subjective  intuition  and  the  neo-Kantian  claim  that  non-
representational  concepts  exists  prior  to  reality  in  the  form of  transcendent  logical
structures. Benjamin’s new theory of orders must be able to overcome this tension by
both providing a sphere of pure knowledge from which concepts can be derived while, at
the same time, providing continuity between experience and the concepts that structure
experience.  Benjamin aims to provide the foundation for a theory of knowledge that
remains  within the  spirit  of  Kantian philosophy without  imposing the  limitations  of
knowledge qua scientific experience. In revising the Kantian theory of knowledge and
experience,  Benjamin  is  able  to  expand  the  sphere  of  possible  experiences  without
reducing the object of experience to an object for a specific type of experience.
31 Benjamin’s  critique of  neo-Kantianism is,  perhaps,  more satisfying than his  proposed
solution, which is underdeveloped in the two texts I examined here. However, perhaps it
is not surprising that, in this context,  Benjamin points to the figure of Johann Georg
Hamann and, moreover, that after his engagement with neo-Kantianism he turned to the
Romantic theory of reflection. (After all, the notion of an immanent absolute stands in
stark contrast to Cohen’s philosophy.) While I have noted disagreements between Cohen
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and Lange,  they share the notion that  the ideal,  the concept  or  the Absolute are in
opposition to existing reality. As Cohen writes in his Religion of Reason:
Messianism degrades and despises and destroys the present actuality, in order to
put in the place of this sensible actuality a new kind of supersensible actuality, not
supernatural, but of the future. The future creates a new earth and a new heaven
and, consequently, a new actuality.34
32 In positing a gulf between a temporally specific experience of either past or present and a
fulfilled experience deferred into the messianic future, Cohen forecloses any possibility of
a  metaphysically  expanded  concept  of  experience  and  denies  the  possibility  of  an
immanent continuity between knowledge and existence. Cohen, therefore, juxtaposes two
realms of experience – the eternal present of finite and immediate sensuous experience,
and the paradoxical eternal novelty of an authentic experience posited in the messianic
future. This, however, rests on the presupposition of the temporally specific conception
of sense experience as something devoid of  significance and meaning.  The messianic
future  resides  within  the  domain  of  universal  history;  the  progressive  universal
development towards an eternal idea, an idea that remains absolutely discontinuous with
the earthly sensuous actuality and activity of human beings. In its nihilistic rejection of
reality,  Cohen’s  neo-Kantianism  lacks  any  force  on  the  present.  It  is  unsurprising,
therefore, that Benjamin turns to Romanticism and its notion of an immanent absolute
for a potential alternative to the problem of modern experience, i.e. the absence of the
Absolute, totality, and unity.
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  aims to examine the relationship between Walter  Benjamin and neo-Kantianism,
particularly Herman Cohen’s logical idealism. I divide the article into two major sections: first, I
examine the development of Cohen’s philosophy and its relationship to Hermann von Helmholtz
and Friedrich  Albert  Lange’s  early  neo-Kantianism;  second,  I  examine Benjamin’s  critique  of
Cohen. I focus specifically on two of Benjamin’s early philosophical works — the fragment “On
Perception” and the text “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy”. Further, I aim to show
how Benjamin attempts to disentangle neo-Kantianism from Kant’s own philosophy. In doing so,
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Benjamin  points  to  an  alternative  from  within  the  tradition  of  Kantian  and  post-Kantian
philosophy.
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